This paper develops four propositions that show that changes in the global job market for science and engineering (S&E) workers are eroding US dominance in S&E, which diminishes comparative advantage in high tech production and creates problems for American industry and workers:
foreseeable future, diminishing the country's comparative advantage in high tech goods and services and threatening the country's global economic leadership. The paper assesses policies that could smooth the transition from the US being the superpower in science and engineering to being one of many centers of excellence.
The analysis can be summarized in four propositions, two relating to the job market for scientific and engineering talent, and two relating to the effects of that market on the economy.
The propositions regarding the science and engineering (S&E ) job market are:
(1) The U.S. share of the world's science and engineering graduates at all degree levels is declining rapidly, as college enrollments have expanded in other countries. The number of S&E PhDs from European and Asian universities, particularly from China, has increased while the number from US universities has stagnated. International students have, in addition, increased their share of advanced S&E degrees from US universities. As a result US reliance on foreignborn scientists and engineers has increased.
2) The job market for young scientists and engineers in the US has worsened relative to job markets for young workers in many other high-level occupations, which discourages US students from going on in these fields. At the same time, rewards are sufficient to attract large immigrant flows, particularly from less developed countries.
The propositions regarding the impact of changes in the supply of science and engineering talent on the country's economic performance are:
3) By increasing the number of scientists and engineers, highly populous low income countries such as China and India can compete with the US in technically advanced industries even though S&E workers are a small proportion of their work forces. This threatens to undo the traditional "North-South" pattern of trade in which advanced countries dominate high tech while 3 developing countries specialize in less skilled manufacturing. 4 . Diminished comparative advantage in high-tech will create adjustment problems for US workers, of which the offshoring of IT jobs to India, growth of high-tech production and exports from China, and multinational movement of R&D facilities to developing countries, are harbingers. The country faces a long transition to a less dominant position in science and engineering associated industries, for which the US will have to develop new labor market and R&D policies that build on existing strengths and develop new ways of benefitting from scientific and technological advances in other countries.
The rest of the paper presents the evidence and arguments for the four propositions and examines the implications for policy.
Proposition 1: The US's share of the world's S&E work force is declining rapidly.
The US share of the world's S&E workers was disproportionately high in the latter half of the 20 th century for historical reasons that include: the flight of many leading European scientists from the Nazis; the slow post-World War II recovery of higher education and science in Europe, which had dominated science before the War; the rapid expansion of mass college education in the U.S. in the 1950s and 1960s; increased US spending on R&D and doctorate S&E education in response to Sputnik; the concentration of Soviet science and engineering on military technology;
and the destructive effects of the cultural revolution on education in China. In 1970 US predominance was such that the country enrolled approximately 30% of tertiary level students in the world. Over half of science and engineering doctorates were granted by US institutions of higher education.
Since then the rest of the world has begun to catch up with the US in higher education and in educating S&E specialists in particular. The number of young persons going to college has 4 increased rapidly in other OECD countries and in many less developed countries, particularly
China. Enrollments in college or university per person aged 20-24 and/or the ratio of degrees granted per 24 year old and in several OECD countries (Australia, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Finland, the United Kingdom, and France) exceeded that in the US. 5 In 2001 5 In -2002 UNCESCO data show that the US enrolled just 14% of tertiary level students -less than half the US share 30 years earlier. 6 In most countries, moreover, a larger proportion of college students studied science and engineering than in the US, so that the US share of students in those fields was considerably lower than the US share overall. In 2000, 17% of all university bachelor's degrees in the US were in the natural sciences and engineering compared to a world average of 27% of degrees, and to 52% of degrees in China. 7 At the graduate level, the PhD is the critical degree in science, particularly for advanced research activities. Exhibit 1 records the ratios of PhDs earned in science and engineering in major PhD producing countries relative to the numbers granted in the US from 1975 to 2001 and extrapolates the numbers to 2010. PhDs in science and engineering outside the US rise sharply whereas the number granted in the U.S. stabilizes at about 18,000 per year. In 2001 the EU granted 40% more S&E PhDs than the U.S. Trend data suggest that the EU will produce nearly twice as many S&E doctorates as the U.S. by 2010 or so.
But the greatest growth is in China. 
trade-offs in supplies
Because changes in the supply from one source affects the total number of S&E workers in the market, those changes necessarily impacts earnings and employment opportunities (Freeman, 1971 (Freeman, , 1975 (Freeman, , 1976 Borjas, 2003) . An increase in the supply of immigrant S&E workers will, all else the same, reduce earnings and employment opportunities below what they otherwise would have been, thus lowering the incentives for persons from that and from other sources to enter the S&E job market. The supply of US born/residents, particularly men, to science and engineering appears to be more responsive to labor market conditions than the supply of the foreign born. This reflects the fact that US born have access to other careers in the country, whereas science and engineering careers may be the only way for many talented foreign-born persons to enter the US job market. The ability to recruit international students and immigrant scientists and engineers for the US S&E job market benefits the country by tapping a large and relatively inexpensive pool of talent at the cost of reduced incentives for native-born individuals to go on in science and engineering.
Trends in demography and in PhD production rates outside the US will reduce the U.S.
share of S&E graduates at all degree levels. Assuming comparable training and ability around the world, US firms and universities who seek the most talented people will increase the foreign born to 44 percent. 21 The share of papers counted in the Chemical Abstract Service fell from 73% in 1980 to 40% in 2003. 22 While attention has focused on the increased scientific capability of China, 23 Latin American countries have also increased their share of science publications. 24 One aspect of the fall in the US share that has attracted attention is that it has been associated with a decline in publications in some disciplines from US-based scientists and engineers (Hicks, 2004) .
As the US share of the world's S&E specialists falls, it is inevitable that the US share of papers will fall, but there is no reason for numbers of papers to fall, given the increased numbers of journals.
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Similarly, as the supply of S&E graduates has increased overseas, many high-tech companies have begun to locate major research installations outside the U.S. In 2004, the CEO of Cisco declared that "Cisco is a Chinese company" when he announced that the firm was setting up its newest R&D facility in China. 26 One of Microsoft's major research facilities is in Beijing.
OECD data shows a large increase in U. Proposition 2: Despite perennial concerns over shortages of scientific and engineering specialists, the job market in most S&E specialties is too weak to attract increasing numbers of US students.
Every few years or so, the scientific establishment and/or the top executives from major high technology firms proclaim that the US has a shortage of S&E workers and call for diverse policies to attract more Americans into the fields and/or to make it easier to bring foreign S&E workers into the country.
Economists have struggled to interpret claims that the U.S. had a shortage of scientific and engineering workers since the 1950s, when such claims first surfaced. In any market-clearing transaction where wages equilibrate demand and supply, there can no "shortage" or "surplus."
There is disappointment about the price, either by suppliers (when a "surplus" reduces prices) or by demanders (when a "shortage" raises price), that can generate longer run responses in the form of investment to increase the supply or substitution of alternative inputs for the high-priced input.
Arrow and Capron interpreted shortages as the result of sluggish wage adjustments. Stigler interpreted them as reflecting rapid changes in wages. Freeman stressed the cyclic nature of shortages and surpluses in the context of a cobweb model of market adjustment.
Wages are not, however, the only equilibrating force or indicator of the state of the labor market. In the market for researchers, the duration of postdoctoral work before obtaining a fulltime job, the probability of getting an independent research grant, or of landing a tenure track job at an institution of given quality, etc, are also important mechanisms for market adjustment. In a loose labor market, young persons are likely to spend more years as post-docs at low postdoctorate pay than in a tight labor market. In 1993 the American Institute of Physics proclaimed "The Physics Job Market: From Bear to Bull in a Decade: What a difference 8 years makes" and used a graph that showed fewer new physics doctorates taking post-docs and more getting jobs to make its point. 29 New PhDs pay close attention to the quality of academic institutions making job offers. In a tight market, graduates end up in highly esteemed labs or universities. In loose markets, they accept jobs in places judged as lower quality.
Whichever indicator one examines, the evidence suggests that the job market for most scientists and engineers in the US has fallen short of the job markets in competitive high level occupations. Exhibit 3 records levels of pay and rates of change in pay from the Census of Population. It shows that scientists and engineers earn less than law and medical school graduate, and that rates of increase in earnings for science and engineering in the 1990's fell short of the rates of increase for doctors and lawyers and for persons with bachelor's degrees.
The Census comparisons of the income between S&E doctorates and persons obtaining medical or law professional degrees understate the lower income associated with the PhD trajectory. Doctoral graduate students typically spend 7-8 years earning their PhD -a quarter of their post-bachelors working life -during which they are paid stipend rates. In some disciplines, notably the life sciences, most spend 3 or so years doing postdoctoral work, again at stipend incomes that fall far below alternative salaries available to bachelors degree holders or those with professional degrees. Since postdocs work many hours, their pay is particularly low on an hourly Combining the pay differences between doctorate scientists and engineers and highly educated workers in other fields together with the difference in years of education and postdoctorate training produces huge differences in lifetime earnings. Translating Census of Population earnings by age group, per the data in exhibit 3, into lifetime incomes, discounted at 5%, biological scientists had lifetime earning on the order of $3 million dollars less over their lifetime than doctors and 1.8 million dollars less than lawyers. Doctors and lawyers pay for their education, while PhD scientists receive fellowships or stipends and rarely pay tuition, though they often work for their fellowship support, but this hardly equates the lifetime earnings. Physicists and mathematicians had higher discounted lifetime earnings than biological scientists, while engineers had the highest earnings among PhDs, but even those earnings fall considerably short of the earnings of doctors.
Looking beyond salaries, the demographics of the academic job market made it increasingly difficult for doctorate graduates to obtain faculty jobs even as older scientists retire.
In 1973 Finally, because NIH grants are awarded to faculty members rather than to post doctorate scientists, the probability that young scientists obtain grants to work as independent investigators has fallen to negligible numbers. Exhibit 5 uses NIH data on the age distribution of recipients of R01 grants, and the age distribution of doctorate life scientists to show how the chances young investigators would get their own grants fell sharply in the past 20 or so years. These data show that the proportion given to scientists less than 35 years old fell from 20% in 1980 to 4% in 2002 whereas the proportion of grants going to scientists aged 45 years and older rose from 22% to 60%. Dividing these proportions by the proportion of doctorates in the relevant age brackets gives the relative odds of obtaining an R01 grant. 30 The relative odds drop from 1.21 to 0.30 for scientists less than 35 years old. In 1980 they had a greater chance of getting an award than older scientists, whereas in 2002 they had a much smaller chance. The relative odds rises for the oldest age group of scientists.
job market for bachelor's and master's graduates
Is there any evidence of shortages in the job market for bachelor's or master's graduates in 14 science and engineering?
The BS in engineering is the key terminal bachelor's degree for scientists and engineers.
S&E employment in industry consists largely of bachelor's engineering graduates. Since the end of world war II, the job market for engineers has shown cyclic oscillations of the cobweb variety. (Freeman, 1971 (Freeman, , 1975 (Freeman, , 1976 was generated by normal immigration patterns. Given much larger numbers of engineering graduates in foreign countries, with huge increases in graduates in India and China, the pool of potential foreign-born engineers is certain to increase. Although only a minority of these graduates are likely to be suitable for the work performed by major multinational firms, even a modest proportion of the increased supply will give more firms the choice between hiring immigrant engineers and scientists in their US facilities or hiring foreign-born specialists in their own countries.
If the labor market measures show that the job market for scientists and engineers has been relatively weak, what explains the large influx of international students and scientists and engineers from overseas into the country?
One reason that foreign born students and degree recipients are attracted to science and engineering work in the US while many US citizens or permanent residents do not find that work attractive is that the foreign-born have lower opportunity costs from other specialties than do
Americans. The higher average incomes in the US, particularly compared to developing countries, and the greater dispersion of earnings in the US, particularly compared to other high income countries, means that US students, particularly the most able, have more lucrative non-S&E options than do foreign-born students. To many foreign-born students or workers, obtaining an S&E education or job is their ticket to the US job market, a green card, and possible citizenship.
Their opportunities in their native country outside of science and engineering are far less attractive than are the opportunities outside of science and engineering to comparable Americans.
Even The increase in the number of under represented minority groups going on in science and engineering is substantial as well. In 1976 blacks and Hispanics earned barely 2% of S&E PhDs granted to US citizens or residents, whereas in 2001 they earned nearly 10% of S&E PhDs granted to US citizens or residents (Chang, Chiang, Freeman) .
Why have women and minorities chosen to enter science and engineering whereas white men have shifted to other fields?
There are two possible explanations. The first is that the proportions of women and minorities in science and engineering in the past was low because S&E did not readily welcome them -implicit or explicit discrimination. The supply of women and minorities was constrained or discouraged. The increased proportions are thus a movement toward a new equilibrium that more properly reflects interests and talents. The second is that the opportunity cost for women and minorities is lower due to less attractive opportunities in other high level occupations. For women, the large increase in the numbers in medical and law schools argues against this factor being as important as the national effort to equalize opportunities and increase diversity in S&E fields.
Whatever the particular causes, it is striking that without an overall improvement in the overall S&E job market, more women and minorities have obtained S&E degrees and entered S&E occupations.
Reconciling the data and the shortage claims
Since labor market measures show no evidence of shortages of S&E workers, is there any way to make sense of continued claims that the US has a shortage of scientists and engineers and of calls for more young Americans to enter these fields rather than others? How can there be a shortage which does not show up in the job market -a shortage that is not a shortage?
One interpretation of the continual claims of a shortage is that they are disingenuous.
Firms benefit from a greater supply of scientists and engineers at given wage rates, or better yet, at lower wage rates. H1-B visas allowed firms to hire trained specialists without the pay rises that would be necessary to attract more US workers. Foreign-born students and post-docs allow principal investigators to produce research at relatively low cost. The greater the supply of postdocs at current pay, the more cost-effective is US research spending. In the 1980s, NSF forecast shortages of scientists and engineers with the seeming goal of increasing supplies so that US firms could hire scientists and engineers at lower wages. Congressional Hearings, which highlighted these forecasts, produced editorials in Science and Nature, and an apology from NSF that has made all analysts dubious of shortage claims (Weinstein).
A second interpretation, which I think more accurately captures current concerns, is that the US has an adequate supply of scientists and engineers only because of the sizeable influx of foreign-born students and employees. If US economic growth and comparative advantage depend substantially on the work of scientific and engineering workers, relying so much on foreign born supplies could be risky. Any interruption or change in the flow of immigrant scientists and engineers would certainly harm US research and development. Imagine NIH without foreign-born post-docs and scientists. Imagine the labs at any major university or high tech firm without foreign-born students. Half of the benches would be empty. From this perspective, the call for more US students to go into science and engineering reflects a belief that the balance between the supply of US born and of foreign-born scientists and engineers may have tilted too much toward the latter. It is not a shortage of scientists and engineers but of US entrants into the field. But many of the persons and firms who make these arguments do not face up to the potential trade-off issue: that to attract more US citizens, earnings and employment opportunities have to get better, which is difficult to effectuate as long as the country can attract many scientists and engineers from overseas at current wages and employment opportunities..
Proposition 3: Technological Edge and Global Competition When Numbers Count
Trade models designed to explain the extensive trade among advanced countries with similar factor endowments posit that the trade occurs because countries gain advantages from being the first-mover on new technologies, which require R&D resources, and/or from increasing returns, say through learning as output increases or through positive spillovers from one firm in a sector to another. In these models countries make their comparative advantage by investment decisions and technological prowess. The Ricardian model developed by Gomory and Baumol presents this analysis in a particularly useful way. In their multi-sector model, advanced countries compete for the most desirable industries. 36 There are many possible free trade equilibrium, some more beneficial to a given country than others, so that gains to one country can come at the has the skilled work force and R&D capability to innovate new goods and services, while the less advanced area (the South) cannot compete in these areas (Krugman, 1979) . As a result the North innovates new goods and trades them with the South, which produces older goods as it gains the technology do so. Once the two regions have access to the same technology, the lower wage South produces the good or service. Workers are higher paid in the North than in the South both because they are more skilled and because the North has a monopoly on the new products. More rapid technological advance increases wages in the North relative to wages in the South while more rapid diffusion of technology has the opposite effect. 37 In these and other trade models, a country benefits when a trading partner or potential trading partner improves technology in a sector in which the country does not compete, but loses when another country improves its technology in a country's export sector. It is good for Alaska if El Salvador improves the technology of banana production, but bad for Nicaragua, since the improved technology will lower cost, increase banana production, and reduce the price of bananas on world markets. The South competes with the North for production of older products through low wages but is unable to compete in the newest technology.
The increased supply of scientific and engineering workers, including doctorate researchers 21 and others able to advance scientific and technological knowledge in large developing countries, threatens to obsolesce this vision of trade between advanced and developing countries. It creates the possibility of human resource leapfrogging, in which large populous developing countries employ enough scientists and engineers to compete with the advanced countries in the high-tech vanguard sectors that innovate new products and processes and thus to threaten the North's monopoly in these sectors.
Three factors are necessary for human resource leapfrogging to shift the comparative advantage in high tech industries from the North to the South:
1. The Southern country must be sufficiently populous that it has large numbers of S&E workers even though it deploys only a relatively small proportion of its work force in those fields.
From the perspective of the US, there are only two countries with sufficiently large populations that they could develop larger S&E work forces than the US: China and India;
2. Research and development productivity depends on the number of scientific and engineering workers applied to a problem. This seems plausible as a broad generalization. The firm or country that allocates, say, 2,000 engineers to a project is likely to beat the firm or country that allocates 1,000 engineers to the same project. But the way a country organizes its R&D and the connection between research activities and business is also likely to affect productivity. The close ties between US universities and business and the well-developed system of competition for research funding arguably gives the US an advantage in turning research input into useful commercial output. Still, eventually numbers may dominate organization.
3. The South has the production competence to develop leading edge commercial products even though the bulk of the Southern work force is less skilled and the South lags behind the North in infra-structure. Again, this is most likely in highly populous countries that could recruit a substantial work force with any skill mix from its huge pool of workers and could develop the appropriate infrastructure in selected areas.
Under these circumstances, a populous developing country could compete in high-tech and engineers to take a global lead in sectors with sizeable employment and significant throughput to the rest of the economy. In this case, the economic losses to the advanced country could be substantial. They would be larger than those that might occur if the advanced country lost its technological advantage to an equally advanced competitor because wages would have to fall more to make another sector competitive with the low wage competitor. 38 In the extremum, if the only reason workers in the North were paid more than those in the South was that the North had a monopoly in innovating new products, the South would effectively become the North and the North would become the South, reversing their relative positions in wages. Technology would be a gold mine, and whichever country possessed the mine would be wealthier than the other.
Does the loss of technological advantage to a lower wage country necessarily harm an advanced country? Ron Jones and Roy Ruffin point out that under some circumstances the loss of technological advantage could benefit the advanced country. In their analysis, the advanced country has an absolute advantage in all sectors, and a comparative advantage in the high tech sector. It loses this comparative advantage so that it is completely wiped out as an exporter of high tech, so it becomes an exporter of the lower tech product. But it remains a high wage country and its living standards rise because the low wage country produces so much of the high tech good at such low prices that the terms of trade improve for the advanced country with the shift in comparative advantage. The US does better by producing apparel than by producing airplanes.
This scenario seems more of a theoretical curiosum than a realistic representation of the current economic world. It occurs only if the advanced country has a large absolute advantage in the low technology product, which becomes its new export product, as well as in the high technology product; and that the large populous country has a work force (presumably measured in effective skill units) that is "much" larger than that of the advanced country; 39 and does not give the high tech export sector any of the special features (greater rates of learning and productivity advance or economies of scale; with high wage jobs) that makes that sector particularly desirable. Loss of technological superiority in a particular sector to a low wage competitor might generate benefits for US consumers, but loss of technological superiority overall is likely to be disastrous for US workers and firms.
Looking at the technological edge that the US (and other advanced countries) have relative to developing countries from a different perspective, Donald Davis and David Weinstein argue that the flow of immigrants and foreign capital into the US reduces US well-being. With more workers and capital the US expands the production of the high tech goods in which the country has a comparative advantage, which drives down the price of those goods, and thus the earnings of native workers and capital. In this model, if foreign born workers remain overseas working with older or less productive technology, they are weaker competitors for American workers and firms.
The implication is that the US could benefit from lower immigration and capital flows. My human resource leapfrogging analysis differs from the Davis and Weinstein analysis by making technological superiority endogenous to the supply of scientists and engineers, rather than an exogenous given. My analysis posits that immigrant scientists and engineers improve US technological competence and thus extend the North's lead in technology, although their supply does reduce the earnings or opportunities for American scientists and engineers. The human resource leapfrog model further assumes that the US technological superiority erodes as the foreign countries build up their science and engineering labor supplies, and as multinational firms 25 locate where those supplies are cost effective. From the perspective of US workers, it is better for US workers to have immigrants use the newest technology in the US rather than having them develop or use it overseas, where wages and labor standards are lower.
Real concerns or paranoia: the title question
So, to what extent, if at all, does globalization of the scientific/engineering workforce threaten US economic leadership?
While the increase in S&E workers in China, India, and other low wage countries, as well as in Europe and Japan, is too recent to provide a definitive answer to the title question, several indicators suggest that the answer is: yes, this form of globalization threatens, for better or worse, US technological and economic leadership.
The first indicator is that major high tech firms are locating new R and D facilities in China and India. This is not a matter of developing products for the Chinese or Indian markets with little expectation that the technology will be used for products in advanced countries. Instead, these facilities will produce advances that will lead to production in those countries for the global market. Microsoft's Advanced Technology Center, which opened in Beijing in 2003, is expected to help the company maintain its lead in technology and to develop and test new products.
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A second indicator is the off-shoring of some forms of skilled work. If educated workers in low wage countries can do similar tasks as educated workers in advanced countries, firms will try to offshore that work to the lower wage locale. While the US government does not measure the number of jobs off-shored, business consultants and business leaders indicate that the number is non-negligible and growing (see Hira and Hira, 2005) . Some experts estimate that on the order of 10%-15% of employment in the US is potentially off-shorable (Bardhan and Kroll, 2003) . For diverse reasons, India has been the main locale for the off-shoring of high level activity, but eventually China will also attract jobs in these areas as well. Advising companies how to offshore is itself a growing industry, with management consultants telling firms that they can gain as much as 40% more in profits from selected activities. In sum, research and technological activity and production are moving where the people are, even when they are located in the low wage "South". It is moving to China because China is graduating huge numbers of scientists and engineers and to India, as well, though more slowly.
Proposition 4: Adjustment Problems and Policies for a New Era
As the number of scientists and engineers working in foreign countries continues to increase, the US's comparative advantage in generating scientific and engineering knowledge and in the high-tech sectors and products associated with that knowledge will decline. This will be good for the world, as the spread of modern technologies to more economies will raise incomes in low income countries. Increased numbers of scientists and engineers will stimulate the growth of scientific and technical knowledge and the rate of technological advance, expanding the global production possibility frontier. The US will benefit from the greater advance of new knowledge and the production of new goods and development of new processes and the reduced costs of products from innovations and products developed elsewhere.
But the US will also face economic difficulties as its technological superiority erodes.
What is good for the world is not inevitably good for the US. The group facing the biggest danger from the loss of America's technological edge are workers whose living standards depend critically on America's technological superiority. The decline in monopoly rents from being the lead country will make it harder for the US to raise wages and benefits to workers. The big winners from the spread of technology will be workers in developing countries, and the firms that employ them, including many US multinational corporations. In the long term, the spread of knowledge and technology around the world will almost certainly outweigh the loss of US hegemony in science and technology, but the transition period is likely to be lengthy and difficultmore formidable than that associated with the recovery of Europe and Japan after World War II.
The more similar the production technologies and composition of output in lower wage countries becomes to that of the US, the greater will be the downward pressures on US wages.
To minimize the costs of adjustment, the US will have to consider new policies in the labor market to distribute the national product more equitably and new policies in the market for R&D and technology to build on existing strengths that will maintain scientific and technical leadership in some sectors and to remain close to the frontier in other areas. The country will also have to find ways to take scientific and technological advances from other countries and turn them into commercial products rapidly.
In the scientific and engineering job market, continued growth in the supplies of highly talented young people will stretch out the transition period and maintain the US as a center of scientific and technological excellence, albeit a less dominant center. The country could do this in several ways. It could continue to encourage large numbers of foreign students and SE immigrants to study and work in the country, at the cost of depressing incentives for domestic supply. If it does this, it ought to think about policies to encourage these students and immigrants to obtain permanent residence and citizenship quickly, to reduce the danger that they might return to their origin country and develop industrial activities that compete with those in the US. At the same time, the country could seek to increase domestic supplies without discouraging foreign students and immigrant, by giving more lucrative graduate research fellowships (which go to US students or residents only) and improving opportunities to do independent research early in a career, which is likely to increase US supplies more than those from foreign countries. On the demand side, the main tool that the US government has to affect S&E intensive activity is the nation's government spending on R and D. Some economists might view any policy to direct that spending toward creating technological advantage in particular sectors as having the flavor of an industrial policy (as Japan did with its MITI activity, which means the government 29 tries to pick industrial winners or protect losers. But a policy for research and development in new technologies is different than a policy of tariffs or subsidies. As long as the government is the main source of support for basic research directly through grants or indirectly through subsidization of universities, its expenditures already help set the technology and thus economy of the future. The doubling of NIH research spending spurred the life sciences, where increased knowledge will be more beneficial to biotechnical firms and the health industries than to most others. The National Nano-tech Initiative will spur engineering and physical sciences, which has the potential to benefit different sectors of the economy. On the other hand, a shift in R and D from areas likely to benefit the civilian economy toward military goals is likely to weaken US technological superiority in normal economic activity.
In adjusting to the globalization of science and engineering and the diminishment of US comparative advantage in high tech sectors, the US has some weaknesses. The country's social insurance system is not well-developed for helping workers cope with a potentially long period of transition. The country has the lowest safety net for workers and the most expensive employmentlinked health insurance system among advanced countries. It has done a relatively poor job in educating lower skill persons and ... you know the litany. But the country also has some great strengths for absorbing the loss of technological superiority in at least some sectors. The high mobility of the US work force should make some adjustments more palatable than if Americans were less willing to move location or change their occupation or industry. American scientists and engineers collaborate regularly with scientists and engineers in other countries. American universities are more closely linked to business and the economy than those in other countries.
This should enable US higher education to continue its role in producing knowledge spillovers to industries in local areas, through spin-offs or other forms of knowledge transfer.
If the country maintains or improves its efficiency in moving knowledge from university labs to commercial products, the US comparative advantage in high technology sectors will be maintained longer than would otherwise be the case. Speaking with a Harvard physicist, whose most readily commercializable work was done collaboratively with overseas scientist and 30 engineers, I commented, "ah, so you are helping them catch up with us", to which I received the reply, "no, they are helping us keep ahead of them". 38. Gomory and Baumol simulate how the loss of technological superiority of one advanced country to another advanced country reduces national income in a two country model. My claim is that loss of technological superiority to a low wage country will have a greater adverseeffect on national income. In a world with multiple sectors and countries, the situation would be more complicated, since the losses could be displaced to other advanced or low wage countries.
39. The model fits in the line of "immiserizing growth" models in which a country that makes a technological advance or investment in an export sector suffers a loss of GDP because the increased output produces an acute deterioration in the terms of trade. 
